When Does a Self-Serving Antitrust Authority Act in Society's Best Interests?
If an antitrust authority chooses policies to maximize the number of successfully prosecuted cartels, when do those policies also serve to minimize the number of cartels that form? When the detection and prosecution of cartels is inherently difficult, we find that an antitrust authority¡¯s policies minimize the number of cartels, as is socially desirable. But when the detection and prosecution of cartels is not difficult, an antitrust authority is not aggressive enough in that it prosecutes too few cartel cases.
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- Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2000.
"Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2349, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Massimo Motta & Michele Polo, "undated". "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," Working Papers 150, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Motta, M. & Polo, M., 1999. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," Economics Working Papers eco99/23, European University Institute.
- Myong-Hun Chang & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2008. "The Impact of a Corporate Leniency Program on Antitrust Enforcement and Cartelization," Economics Working Paper Archive 548, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs," Economics Working Paper Archive 527, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
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- Joseph E. Harrington & Myong-Hun Chang, 2009. "Modeling the Birth and Death of Cartels with an Application to Evaluating Competition Policy," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(6), pages 1400-1435, December.
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