The Impact of a Corporate Leniency Program on Antitrust Enforcement and Cartelization
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References listed on IDEAS
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs," Economics Working Paper Archive 527, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Ari Hyytinen & Frode Steen & Otto Toivanen, 2018.
"Cartels Uncovered,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 190-222, November.
- Hyytinen, Ari & Steen, Frode & Toivanen, Otto, 2010. "Cartels Uncovered," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 10/2010, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
- Hyytinen, Ari & Steen, Frode & Toivanen, Otto, 2010. "Cartels Uncovered," CEPR Discussion Papers 7761, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Georg Clemens & Holger A. Rau, 2019. "Do discriminatory leniency policies fight hard‐core cartels?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 336-354, April.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2009. "When Does a Self-Serving Antitrust Authority Act in Society's Best Interests?," Economics Working Paper Archive 549, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Jihyun Park & Juhyun Lee & Suneung Ahn, 2018. "Bayesian Approach for Estimating the Probability of Cartel Penalization under the Leniency Program," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 10(6), pages 1-15, June.
- Yannis Katsoulacos & Evgenia Motchenkova & David Ulph, 2015.
"Measuring the Effectiveness of Anti-cartel Interventions: A Conceptual Framework,"
Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance
201602, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews, revised 13 Jan 2016.
- Yannis Katsoulacos & Evgenia Motchenkova & David Ulph, 2016. "Measuring the Effectiveness of Anti-Cartel Interventions: A Conceptual Framework," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-002/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Khemla Prishnee Armoogum & Stephen Davies & Franco Mariuzzo, 2017. "Cartel enforcement and deterrence over the life of a Competition Authority," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2017-04, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Gärtner, Dennis L. & Zhou, Jun, 2012. "Delays in Leniency Application: Is There Really a Race to the Enforcer's Door?," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 395, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Maria Bigoni & Sven-Olof Fridolfsson & Chloé Le Coq & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015.
"Trust, Leniency, and Deterrence,"
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(4), pages 663-689.
- Bigoni, Maria & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloe & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2011. "Trust, Leniency and Deterrence," Working Paper Series 859, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 11 Dec 2014.
- Bigoni, Maria & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloé & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2014. "Trust, Leniency and Deterrence," Konkurrensverket Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 2014:2, Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority).
- Bigoni, Maria & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloé & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2012. "Trust and Deterrence," CEPR Discussion Papers 9002, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gärtner, D.L. & Zhou, J., 2012. "Delays in Leniency Application : Is There Really a Race to the Enforcer’s Door?," Discussion Paper 2012-044, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Asker, John, 2010. "Leniency and post-cartel market conduct: Preliminary evidence from parcel tanker shipping," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 407-414, July.
- Joan-Ramon Borrell & Juan Luis Jiménez & Carmen García, 2014.
"Evaluating Antitrust Leniency Programs,"
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 107-136.
- Joan Ramón Borrell & Juan Luís Jiménez & Carmen García, 2012. "Evaluating antitrust leniency programs," Working Papers XREAP2012-01, Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP), revised Jan 2012.
- Tebbe, Eva, 2018. "Once bitten, twice shy? Market size affects the effectiveness of a leniency program by (de-)activating hysteresis effects," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168304, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2009-01-03 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2009-01-03 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-REG-2009-01-03 (Regulation)
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