Subscribing to Supplemental Health Insurance in France: A Dynamic Analysis of Adverse Selection
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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- Mohamed Ali Ben Halima & Thierry Debrand & Camille Regaert, 2012. "Sick Leaves: Understanding Disparities Between French Departments," Working Papers DT50, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Oct 2012.
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More about this item
KeywordsSupplemental health insurance; adverse selection; health insurance demand; longitudinal analysis.;
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-12-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HEA-2010-12-23 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2010-12-23 (Insurance Economics)
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