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Do shareholders really own the firm?

Author

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  • Tristan BOYER

Abstract

The object of this contribution is to address the question of the ownership of the firm. Both law and economics shape representations of the world: law focuses on rules and justice; economics focuses on efficiency and allocation. They describe common

Suggested Citation

  • Tristan BOYER, 2014. "Do shareholders really own the firm?," Working Papers 2014-341, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  • Handle: RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-341
    as

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    File URL: http://www.ipag.fr/wp-content/uploads/recherche/WP/IPAG_WP_2014_341.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Boyer, Tristan, 2002. "Gouvernement d'entreprise et d├ęcisions d'emploi
      [Corporate Governance and employment decisions]
      ," MPRA Paper 10287, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance; agency theory; law & economics; property rights; stakeholder approach;

    JEL classification:

    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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