IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfscr/2016-348.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Brazil: 2016 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Brazil

Author

Listed:
  • International Monetary Fund

Abstract

The economy is still in its deepest recession in decades, partly the result of the failure of past policies. The recession has been aggravated by a political crisis, which had, until recently, paralyzed policymaking and further damaged confidence. President Rousseff was impeached for responsibility crimes related to fiscal practices on August 31, and the government that took office in May will remain in charge until January 1st, 2019. Markets have responded positively to the new government’s reform agenda, bolstering asset prices and confidence and helping the country ride a positive wave of sentiment toward emerging economies. However, while some high-frequency indicators suggest the recession may be nearing its end, the implementation of much-needed reforms to durably restore policy credibility is subject to risks.

Suggested Citation

  • International Monetary Fund, 2016. "Brazil: 2016 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Brazil," IMF Staff Country Reports 2016/348, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfscr:2016/348
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=44392
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carlos Mulas-Granados, 2006. "Economics, Politics and Budgets," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-0-230-50163-8.
    2. Alesina, A. & Passalacqua, A., 2016. "The Political Economy of Government Debt," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 2599-2651, Elsevier.
    3. Weingast, Barry R & Shepsle, Kenneth A & Johnsen, Christopher, 1981. "The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 642-664, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gilles Saint‐Paul & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2021. "Engineering crises: Favoritism and strategic fiscal indiscipline," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 583-610, November.
    2. Sebastian Dellepiane & Niamh Hardiman, 2012. "Fiscal Politics In Time: Pathways to Fiscal Consolidation, 1980-2012," Working Papers 201228, Geary Institute, University College Dublin.
    3. Panizza, Ugo & Fatás, Antonio & Ghosh, Atish R. & ,, 2019. "The Motives to Borrow," CEPR Discussion Papers 13735, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Samuele Murtinu & Giulio Piccirilli & Agnese Sacchi, 2016. "Fiscal Policy, Government Polarization, and the Economic Literacy of Voters," Working papers 50, Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica.
    5. Frank, Marco & Stadelmann, David, 2021. "More federal legislators lead to more resources for their constituencies: Evidence from exogenous differences in seat allocations," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 230-243.
    6. Gamalerio, Matteo, 2020. "Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    7. Simon Berset & Martin Huber & Mark Schelker, 2023. "The fiscal response to revenue shocks," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(3), pages 814-848, June.
    8. Christoph March & Robert K. von Weizsäcker & Robert K. von Weizsäcker, 2016. "Coordinating Intergenerational Redistribution and the Repayment of Public Debt," CESifo Working Paper Series 6075, CESifo.
    9. Antonio Cusato Novelli, 2021. "Sovereign default, political instability and political fragmentation," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 732-755, September.
    10. Maximilian Kellner, 2023. "Strategic effects of stock pollution: the positive theory of fiscal deficits revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 157-179, January.
    11. Ernesto Crivelli & Mr. Sanjeev Gupta & Mr. Carlos Mulas-Granados & Carolina Correa-Caro, 2016. "Fragmented Politics and Public Debt," IMF Working Papers 2016/190, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Christoph March & Robert K. Weizsäcker, 2020. "Coordinating intergenerational redistribution and the repayment of public debt: an experimental test of Tabellini (1991)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(2), pages 301-323, August.
    13. Acosta, Román & Cortés, Josué, 2022. "Loans and employment: Evidence from bank-specific liquidity shocks," Latin American Journal of Central Banking (previously Monetaria), Elsevier, vol. 3(2).
    14. Mr. Emanuele Baldacci & Mr. Sanjeev Gupta & Mr. Carlos Mulas-Granados, 2010. "Restoring Debt Sustainability After Crises: Implications for the Fiscal Mix," IMF Working Papers 2010/232, International Monetary Fund.
    15. Feld, Lars P., 2018. "The quest for fiscal rules," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 18/09, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    16. Kellner, Maximilian, 2020. "Environmental Pollution & the Political Economy of Public Debt," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224561, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    17. Kantorowicz, Jarosław, 2017. "Electoral systems and fiscal policy outcomes: Evidence from Poland," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 36-60.
    18. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    19. Hahn Robert, 2010. "Designing Smarter Regulation with Improved Benefit-Cost Analysis," Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-19, July.
    20. Akai, Nobuo & Sato, Motohiro, 2008. "Too big or too small? A synthetic view of the commitment problem of interregional transfers," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 551-559, November.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfscr:2016/348. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Akshay Modi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/imfffus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.