IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ime/imedps/11-e-04.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Good Securitization, Bad Securitization

Author

Listed:
  • Guillaume Plantin

    (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR (E-mail: guillaume.plantin@tse-fr.eu))

Abstract

I use a simple banking model to study the circumstances under which excessive and inefficient securitization may occur. I first stress that increasing securitization rates that reduce banks' incentives to screen borrowers and thus lead to more defaults need not be inefficient. This may be an efficient response to higher gains from trade between banks and fixed-income markets in the presence of bank moral hazard. I then argue that if reaping such higher gains from trade induces a reduction in the informational efficiency of the securitization market, then there is room for excessive securitization. The model points at increased transparency and informational efficiency of the securitization market as key improvements for the future of the banking system.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillaume Plantin, 2011. "Good Securitization, Bad Securitization," IMES Discussion Paper Series 11-E-04, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
  • Handle: RePEc:ime:imedps:11-e-04
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/research/papers/english/11-E-04.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shin, Hyun Song & Adrian, Tobias, 2008. "Financial intermediaries, financial stability and monetary policy," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 287-334.
    2. Alan Greenspan, 1996. "Opening remarks," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 1-5.
    3. Okina, Kunio & Shirakawa, Masaaki & Shiratsuka, Shigenori, 2001. "The Asset Price Bubble and Monetary Policy: Japan's Experience in the Late 1980s and the Lessons: Background Paper," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 19(S1), pages 395-450, February.
    4. Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner, 2013. "Macroprudential Policy – A Literature Review," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(5), pages 846-878, December.
    5. Frederic S. Mishkin & Adam S. Posen, 1997. "Inflation targeting: lessons from four countries," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Aug, pages 9-110.
    6. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-560, October.
    7. Pozsar, Zoltan & Adrian, Tobias & Ashcraft, Adam B. & Boesky, Hayley, 2013. "Shadow banking," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Dec, pages 1-16.
      • Zoltan Pozsar & Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft & Hayley Boesky, 2010. "Shadow banking," Staff Reports 458, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    8. Mathias Drehmann & Claudio Borio & Leonardo Gambacorta & Gabriel Jiminez & Carlos Trucharte, 2010. "Countercyclical capital buffers: exploring options," BIS Working Papers 317, Bank for International Settlements.
    9. Shiratsuka, Shigenori, 2001. "Is There a Desirable Rate of Inflation? A Theoretical and Empirical Survey," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 19(2), pages 49-83, May.
    10. Masazumi Hattori & Hyun Song Shin & Wataru Takahashi, 2009. "A Financial System Perspective on Japan's Experience in the Late 1980s," IMES Discussion Paper Series 09-E-19, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Optimal securitization
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-04-12 19:06:00

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Pagès, Henri, 2013. "Bank monitoring incentives and optimal ABS," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 30-54.
    2. Chemla, Gilles & Hennessy, Christopher, 2011. "Security Design: Signaling versus Speculative Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 8336, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/11540 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6311 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Cerasi, Vittoria & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2014. "Rethinking the regulatory treatment of securitization," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 10(C), pages 20-31.
    6. Chemla, Gilles & Hennessy, Christopher, 2011. "Privately versus Publicly Optimal Skin in the Game: Optimal Mechanism and Security Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 8403, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    banking; securitization; liquidity;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Lists

    This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
    1. Economic Logic blog

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ime:imedps:11-e-04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kinken). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/imegvjp.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.