To spy or not to (fire the) spy: The benefits of acquiring information about rivals¡¯ play in Bertrand competition
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More about this item
Keywords
Industrial espionage; price leadership; collusion; antitrust policy; incomplete information;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2017-01-08 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2017-01-08 (Industrial Organization)
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