Earnings Management in Nonprofit Organizations: Does Governmental Financing Play a Role?
A vast amount of research has documented the existence of earnings management in for-profit settings. Nonprofit organizations are thought to pay less attention to the bottom line of the income statement. Earnings management research in nonprofit settings has therefore focused on the manipulation of expenses in order to improve efficiency ratios or taxable income, not reported earnings per se. Given a setting in which such ratios are not reported to the public, manipulation of the actual bottom line by nonprofit organizations is explored in light of the importance of governmental subsidies. The results suggest that nonprofit organizations drive their results towards the breakeven point and that manipulation seems to be intensified by increased governmental funding.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://research.hubrussel.be|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- S. Verbruggen & J. Christiaens & K. Milis, 2009. "Can resource dependence and coercive isomorphism explain nonprofit organizations’ compliance with reporting standards?," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 09/616, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
- Brickley, James A & Van Horn, R Lawrence, 2002. "Managerial Incentives in Nonprofit Organizations: Evidence from Hospitals," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(1), pages 227-249, April.
- McNichols, Maureen F., 2000. "Research design issues in earnings management studies," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4-5), pages 313-345.
- Deneffe, Daniel & Masson, Robert T., 2002. "Erratum to "What do not-for-profit hospitals maximize?": [Internat. J. of Ind. Organization 20(4) (2002) 461-492]," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(7), pages 1059-1059, September.
- Burgstahler, David & Dichev, Ilia, 1997. "Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 99-126, December.
- Deneffe, Daniel & Masson, Robert T., 2002. "What do not-for-profit hospitals maximize?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 461-492, April.
- Fields, Thomas D. & Lys, Thomas Z. & Vincent, Linda, 2001. "Empirical research on accounting choice," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 255-307, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hub:wpecon:201035. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sabine Janssens)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.