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Individually-Rational Collective Choice under Random Preferences

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Abstract

In this paper I consider the following problem: there is a collection of exogenously given socially feasible sets, and for each one of them, each one of a group of individuals chooses from an individually feasible set. The fact that the product of the individually feasible sets is larger than the socially feasible set notwithstanding, there arises no conflict between individuals. Assuming that individual preferences are random, I here characterize collective choices in terms of the way in which individual preferences must co-vary in order to explain them. I do this by combining standard revealed preference theory and its counterpart under random preferences. I also argue that there exist collective choices that cannot be rationalized, and hence that the individual rationality assumption can be refuted.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrés Carvajal, 2004. "Individually-Rational Collective Choice under Random Preferences," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/29, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Nov 2004.
  • Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:0429
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    1. Matzkin, Rosa L. & Richter, Marcel K., 1991. "Testing strictly concave rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 287-303, April.
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    Keywords

    Revealed preference; random utility; collective choice; individual rationality;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis

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