Q-anonymous social welfare relations on infinite utility streams
This paper studies a class of social welfare relations (SWRs) on the set of infinite utility streams. In particular, we examine the SWRs satisfying Q-Anonymity, an impartiality axiom stronger than Finite Anonymity, as well as Strong Pareto and a certain equity axiom. First, we characterize the extension of the generalized Lorenz SWR by combining Q-Anonymity with Strong Pareto and Pigou-Dalton Equity. Second, we replace Pigou-Dalton Equity with Hammond Equity for characterizing the extended leximin SWR. Third, we give an alternative characterization of the extended utilitarian SWR by substituting Incremental Equity for Pigou-Dalton Equity.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||First version, September 10, 2007; Current version, August 8, 2008|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi City, Tokyo 186-8603|
Web page: http://cis.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Asheim, Geir B. & Buchholz, Wolfgang & Tungodden, Bertil, 2001.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 252-268, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:piecis:391. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.