Resolving distributional conflicts between generations
We describe a new approach to the problem of resolving distributional conflicts between an infinite and countable number of generations. We impose conditions on the social preferences that capture the following idea: If preference (or indifference) holds between truncated paths for infinitely many truncating times, then preference (or indifference) holds also between the untruncated infinite paths. In this framework we use such conditions to (1) characterize different versions of leximin and utilitarianism by means of equity conditions well-known from the finite setting, and (2) illustrate the problem of combining Strong Pareto and impartiality in an intergenerational setting. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004
Volume (Year): 24 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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