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The Optimality of Power in Organizations: Power Acquisition Process and Evaluation

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  • Moriya, Fumitoshi
  • 森谷, 文利

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  • Moriya, Fumitoshi & 森谷, 文利, 2006. "The Optimality of Power in Organizations: Power Acquisition Process and Evaluation," Working Paper Series 036, Center for Japanese Business Studies (HJBS), Graduate School of Commerce and Management Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:hjbswp:036
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    File URL: https://hit-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/2051764/files/070hjbsWP_036.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Milgrom, Paul R, 1988. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 42-60, February.
    2. Milgrom, Paul R, 1988. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 42-60, February.
    3. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    4. Julio J. Rotemberg, 1993. "Power in Profit‐Maximizing Organizations," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 165-198, June.
    5. Raghuram Rajan & Henri Servaes & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(1), pages 35-80, February.
    6. Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1995. "Overt Interfunctional Conflict (and its Reduction Through Business Strategy)," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 630-653, Winter.
    7. Yeon-Koo Che & Seung-Weon Yoo, 2001. "Optimal Incentives for Teams," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 525-541, June.
    8. David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 2000. "The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent‐Seeking and Inefficient Investment," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(6), pages 2537-2564, December.
    9. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
    10. Lars A. Stole & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1996. "Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(3), pages 375-410.
    11. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432.
    12. Kong-Pin Chen, 2003. "Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 119-140, April.
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