Endogenous Relationship Banking to Alleviate Excessive Screening in Transaction Banking
This paper analyzes how learning a borrower's creditworthiness, from past lending decision by a rival bank that is publicly observable through private or public credit reporting systems, affects the performance of subsequent lending competitions. Our analysis of twicerepeated lending competitions demonstrates that such ex post information sharing causes inefficient and excessive screening of new borrowers when banks undertake transaction banking since each bank expects future disadvantages to result from the information revelation. Relationship banking arises endogenously as a defense against such anticipated disadvantage, and improves the economic efficiency by alleviating the excessive screening.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2006|
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- Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1995. "Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 557-575.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Milgrom, Paul R. & Weber, Robert J., 1983. "Competitive bidding and proprietary information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 161-169, April.
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