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The Effectiveness of Corporate Boards: Evidence from Bank Loan Contracting

Listed author(s):
  • Francis, Bill
  • Hasan, Iftekhar
  • Koetter, Michael
  • Wu, Qiang

This paper investigates the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and non-price loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants and performance pricing) are more favorable and syndicated loans comprise more lenders. In addition, board size, board diversity, audit committee structure and other director characteristics also influence bank loan price. However they do not consistently affect all non-price loan terms except for audit committee independence. Moreover, the impact of board independence on bank loans varies with borrower characteristics (e.g., leverage, tangibility and anti-takeover environments) and loan characteristics (e.g., loan types and loan structures). Overall, our study provides strong evidence that banks tend to recognize the benefits of board monitoring in mitigating agency risk and information risk, and reward borrowers with higher quality boards with more favorable loan contract terms.

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Paper provided by Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series CEI Working Paper Series with number 2009-08.

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Length: 67 p.
Date of creation: Nov 2009
Handle: RePEc:hit:hitcei:2009-08
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