Predictors of customer loyalty in automobile insurance: The role of private information in risky driving behavior and claim history
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Alma Cohen, 2012.
"Asymmetric Learning in Repeated Contracting: An Empirical Study,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 94(2), pages 419-432, May.
- Alma Cohen, 2008. "Asymmetric Learning in Repeated Contracting: An Empirical Study," NBER Working Papers 13752, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
More about this item
KeywordsAsymmetric information; insurance; accidents; adverse selection; propitious selection;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-02-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-02-12 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IAS-2011-02-12 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MKT-2011-02-12 (Marketing)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:vtiwps:2011_002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mats Berggren). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/tevtise.html .