IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Strategy-proof market clearing mechanisms

Registered author(s):

    Consider a market for a resource under disequilibrium prices where suppliers and demanders are privately informed about their optimal supply and consumption levels. Strategy-proof market clearing mechanisms give suppliers and demanders dominant strategy incentives to truthfully reveal this information. We describe the class of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms responding well to changes in supplies and demands, as formalized by the "replacement principle" (Thomson, 2007). Since no symmetry or anonymity conditions are imposed, these mechanisms can implement a wide array of distributional objectives in both indivisible and divisible resource allocation situations. These mechanisms apply to allocation problems involving network constraints modeling necessary conditions for a transfer of the resource from a supplier to a demander.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles//E/E/D/%7BEEDE664A-5E67-4367-8B5E-08DAE391A008%7Ddpbe4_2014.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark in its series Discussion Papers of Business and Economics with number 4/2014.

    as
    in new window

    Length: 29 pages
    Date of creation: 06 Mar 2014
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2014_004
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark
    Phone: 65 50 32 33
    Fax: 65 50 32 37
    Web page: http://www.sdu.dk/ivoe
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O. & Neme, Alejandro, 1997. "Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-21, January.
    2. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    3. Anna Bogomolnaia & Herve Moulin, 2004. "Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 257-279, 01.
    4. Thomson, William, 1997. "The Replacement Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 145-168, September.
    5. Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2007. "Bribe-proof rules in the division problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 331-343, November.
    6. William Thomson, 2007. "Fair Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 539, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    7. Bochet, Olivier & İlkılıç, Rahmi & Moulin, Hervé, 2013. "Egalitarianism under earmark constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 535-562.
    8. Bochet, Olivier & Ilkilic, Rahmi & Moulin, Hervé & Sethuraman, Jay, 2012. "Balancing supply and demand under bilateral constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    9. Lensberg, Terje, 1987. "Stability and Collective Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 935-61, July.
    10. Satterthwaite, Mark A & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 587-97, October.
    11. William Thomson, 1999. "Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: A survey and open questions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 373-394.
    12. Özgür Kıbrıs & Serkan Küçükşenel, 2009. "Uniform trade rules for uncleared markets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 101-121, January.
    13. Moulin, Herve, 1987. "The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism versus Laissez-Fairism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(4), pages 769-83, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2014_004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lene Holbæk)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.