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Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing


  • Hoel, Michael

    () (Department of Economics)

  • Iversen, Tor

    () (Institute of Health Management and Health Economics)


Privacy of information is a central concern in the debate about genetic testing. Two types of social inefficiencies may occur when information about prevention and test status is private; genetic testing may not be done when it is socially efficient and genetic testing may be done although it is socially inefficient. The first type of inefficiency is shown to be likely for consumers with public insurance only, while the second type of inefficiency is likely for those with a mix of public/private insurance. This second type of inefficiency is shown to be more important the less effective prevention is.

Suggested Citation

  • Hoel, Michael & Iversen, Tor, 2009. "Impact of the public/private mix of health insurance on genetic testing," HERO On line Working Paper Series 1999:1, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:oslohe:1999_001

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Tabarrok, Alexander, 1994. "Genetic testing: An economic and contractarian analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 75-91, March.
    2. Besley, Timothy & Hall, John & Preston, Ian, 1998. "Private and public health insurance in the UK," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 491-497, May.
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    More about this item


    Health insurance; genetic testing;

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

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