Resale Price Maintenance And Up-Front Payments: Achieving Horizontal Control Under Seller And Buyer Power
We consider a setting where an upstream producer and a competitive fringe of producers of a substitute product may sell their products to two differentiated downstream retailers. We investigate two different contracting games; one with seller power and a second game with buyer power. In each game we characterize the minimum set of vertical restraints that make the vertically integrated profit sustainable as an equilibrium outcome, and we also characterize sufficient conditions for having interlocking relationships (i.e. no exclusion). In line with the recent literature, we focus on the performance of simple two-part tariffs, upfront payments and RPM as facilitating devices for reducing competition under both buyer and seller power. With seller power we show that minimum RPM, possibly coupled with a quantity roof, will allow the manufacturer to induce industry wide monopoly prices. With buyer power we show that monopoly prices may be induced if the retailers may use an upfront fee together with a two-part tariff and a minimum RPM.
|Date of creation:||11 Apr 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Institutt for økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen, Postboks 7802, 5020 Bergen, Norway|
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/en
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