Equilibrium selection in supermodular games with mean payoff technologies
We examine an evolutionary model of equilibrium selection, where all individuals interact with each other, recurrently playing a strictly supermodular game. Individuals play (myopic) best responses to the current population profile, occa- sionally they pick an arbitrary strategy at random. To address the robustness of equilibrium selection in this simultaneous play scenario, we investigate whether different best-response approximations can lead to different long run equilibria.
|Date of creation:||10 Nov 2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Institutt for økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen, Postboks 7802, 5020 Bergen, Norway|
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