Equilibrium Selection in Games with Macroeconomic Complementarities
We apply the stochastic evolutionary approach of equilibrium selection to macroeconomic models in which a complementarity at the macro level is present. These models often exhibit multile Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria , and the best response-correspondence of an individual increases with a measure of the aggregate state of the economy.
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|Date of creation:||2000|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway|
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
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