Economic integration and political fragmentation
The purpose of this article is to provide an economic analysis of the relationship between economic integration and political fragmentation. This follows previous contributions from Alesina et al (2000), Casella (2001, Casella and Feinstein (2002), or Leite-Monteiro and Sato (2003). We go a step further than these authors by assuming that economic integration and political fragmentation are both decided by a majority vote. As them, we observe that economic integration involves political fragmentation. But, we establish also that economic integration might be sometimes deterred by the majority to prevent political fragmentation from happening.
|Date of creation:||18 Jan 2011|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00557242|
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- Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1997.
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- Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore & Romain Wacziarg, 1997. "Economic Integration and Political Disintegration," NBER Working Papers 6163, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2011. "The Theory of `Internal Exit', a comment on Buchanan and Faith (1987)," Working Papers halshs-00557218, HAL.
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- Peter H. Lindert & Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2003. "Does Globalization Make the World More Unequal?," NBER Chapters,in: Globalization in Historical Perspective, pages 227-276 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alessandra Casella & Jonathan S. Feinstein, 2002. "Public Goods in Trade on the Formation of Markets and Jurisdictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(2), pages 437-462, May.
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- Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
- Leite-Monteiro, Manuel & Sato, Motohiro, 2003. "Economic integration and fiscal devolution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2507-2525, October.
- Faini, Riccardo & Galli, Giampaolo & Gennari, Pietro & Rossi, Fulvio, 1997. "An empirical puzzle: Falling migration and growing unemployment differentials among Italian regions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 571-579, April.
- Buchanan, James M & Faith, Roger L, 1987. "Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1023-1031, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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