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Estimating Separable Matching Models

Author

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  • Alfred Galichon

    (NYU - New York University [New York] - NYU - NYU System, ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Bernard Salanié

    (Columbia University [New York])

Abstract

In this paper we propose two simple methods to estimate models of matching with transferable and separable utility introduced in Galichon and Salanié (2022). The first method is a minimum distance estimator that relies on the generalized entropy of matching. The second relies on a reformulation of the more special but popular Choo and Siow (2006) model; it uses generalized linear models (GLMs) with two-way fixed effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salanié, 2022. "Estimating Separable Matching Models," Working Papers hal-03936122, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03936122
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03936122
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edoardo Ciscato & Alfred Galichon & Marion Goussé, 2020. "Like Attract Like? A Structural Comparison of Homogamy across Same-Sex and Different-Sex Households," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(2), pages 740-781.
    2. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Salanié & Yoram Weiss, 2017. "Partner Choice, Investment in Children, and the Marital College Premium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(8), pages 2109-2167, August.
    3. Steven T. Berry, 1994. "Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differentiation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 242-262, Summer.
    4. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
    5. Pierre-André Chiappori & Alfred Galichon & Bernard Salanié, 2019. "On Human Capital and Team Stability," Journal of Human Capital, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 236-259.
    6. Jeremy T. Fox & Chenyu Yang & David H. Hsu, 2018. "Unobserved Heterogeneity in Matching Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(4), pages 1339-1373.
    7. Eugene Choo & Aloysius Siow, 2006. "Who Marries Whom and Why," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(1), pages 175-201, February.
    8. Berry, Steven & Levinsohn, James & Pakes, Ariel, 1995. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 841-890, July.
    9. Steven Berry & Ariel Pakes, 2007. "The Pure Characteristics Demand Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1193-1225, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Dupuy, Arnaud & Raux, Morgan & Signorelli, Sara, 2024. "Digitalization, Change in Skill Distance between Occupations and Worker Mobility: A Gravity Model Approach," IZA Discussion Papers 17535, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; Marriage; Assignment; Estimations comparison;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General
    • C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General

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