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Instruments économiques, justification et normes de justice : le cas de la politique climatique


  • Olivier Godard

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)


Instruments of public policy involve more than themselves. They have to go through a political process of drawing up and adopting that shapes their properties, often far from expectations projected on these instruments by economic analysis. The study of international coordination around the climate issue reveals that the choice of an instrument can make the decision regarding how to qualify the situation and choose appropriate normative benchmarks, and then reconfigure the problems of distributive justice to solve. Any linear sequential approach of building an instrumental regime wanted "fair and effective" is so vain. In parallel the failure of the carbon tax in France shows how a "civic" rationale may take up an unfamiliar instrument, as originally designed according to strict "industrial-merchant" concepts, to the point of inducing its abortion. An economic logic focused on cost-effectiveness saw no differences where the fiscal logic saw essential and unjustifiable ones in the name of its civic foundations. Suggestions are made on how to approach this interweaving.

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  • Olivier Godard, 2012. "Instruments économiques, justification et normes de justice : le cas de la politique climatique," Working Papers hal-00689762, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00689762
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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Olivier Godard, 2011. "Négociations sur le climat : la bifurcation opérée à Copenhague en 2009," Post-Print hal-00637983, HAL.
    2. Kverndokk, S., 1992. "Tradeable CO2 Emission Permits: Initial Distribution as a Justice Problem," Memorandum 23/1992, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    3. Olivier Godard, 1990. "Environnement, modes de coordination et systèmes de légitimité : analyse de la catégorie de patrimoine naturel," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 41(2), pages 215-242.
    4. Olivier Godard, 1989. "Jeux de natures : quand le débat sur l'efficacité des politiques publiques contient la question de leur légitimité," Post-Print halshs-00626705, HAL.
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    More about this item


    Policy instruments; climate change; tradeable permits; carbon tax; civic order.; Instruments de politique; changement climatique; marché de permis; taxe carbone; justification; ordre civique;

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