IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/hal-00678997.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Sharing Water from many Rivers

Author

Listed:
  • Yann Rébillé

    (LEMNA - Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique - UN - Université de Nantes)

  • Lionel Richefort

    () (LEMNA - Laboratoire d'économie et de management de Nantes Atlantique - UN - Université de Nantes)

Abstract

This paper studies the problem of non-cooperative water allocation between heterogeneous communities embodied in an acyclic network of water sources. The extraction activity of a community has a negative impact on the extraction activity of its direct successors: it reduces the intensity of water flows entering their source, and thus, increase their convex costs of water extraction. We show that the equilibrium profile is unique and may be expressed through complementarity and substitutability effects which sharacterize the incoming centrality of a community in the network of sources. For each community, the efficient activity is a combination of two opposite network effects, the incoming centrality and the outcoming centrality. Then, the optimal tax rate imposed to a community depends on the network structure, and reflects both the marginal damages and the marginal benefits this community delivers to other communities at the efficient extraction activity profile.

Suggested Citation

  • Yann Rébillé & Lionel Richefort, 2012. "Sharing Water from many Rivers," Working Papers hal-00678997, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00678997
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00678997
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00678997/document
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rébillé, Yann & Richefort, Lionel, 2014. "Equilibrium existence and uniqueness in network games with additive preferences," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 232(3), pages 601-606.
    2. Yann Rébillé & Lionel Richefort, 2015. "Influence and Social Tragedy in Networks," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 125(6), pages 811-833.
    3. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Gómez-Rúa, María & Molis, Elena, 2015. "Sharing the costs of cleaning a river: the Upstream Responsibility rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 134-150.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    flowing water; network of sources; equilibrium effects; efficiency effects; optimal tax;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00678997. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.