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The Role of Knowhow Acquisition in the Formation and Duration of Joint Ventures

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Habib

    (Swiss Banking Institute - UZH - Universität Zürich [Zürich] = University of Zurich)

  • Pierre Mella-Barral

    (Institute of Finance and Accounting - London Business School)

Abstract

We analyze the role of knowhow acquisition in the formation and duration of joint ventures. Two parties become partners in a joint venture to benefit from each other's knowhow. Joint operations provide each party with the opportunity to acquire part of its partner's knowhow. A party's increased knowhow provides the impetus for the dissolution of the joint venture. We characterize the conditions under which dissolution takes place, identify the party that buys out its partner, determine the time to dissolution, establish its comparative statics, and examine the implications of knowledge acquisition for the desirability of joint venture formation.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Habib & Pierre Mella-Barral, 2003. "The Role of Knowhow Acquisition in the Formation and Duration of Joint Ventures," Working Papers hal-00597770, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00597770
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nishide, Katsumasa & Tian, Yuan, 2011. "Compensation measures for alliance formation: A real options analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 219-228.
    2. Mantecon, Tomas & Liu, Ian & Gao, Fei, 2012. "Empirical evidence of the value of monitoring in joint ownership," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1045-1056.
    3. Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2014. "Investment timing decisions of managers under endogenous contracts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 607-627.
    4. Ancarani, Alessandro & Di Mauro, Carmela & Fratocchi, Luciano & Orzes, Guido & Sartor, Marco, 2015. "Prior to reshoring: A duration analysis of foreign manufacturing ventures," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 141-155.
    5. Cvitanic, Jaksa & Radas, Sonja & Sikic, Hrvoje, 2011. "Co-development ventures: Optimal time of entry and profit-sharing," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 1710-1730, October.
    6. Beshears, John, 2013. "The performance of corporate alliances: Evidence from oil and gas drilling in the Gulf of Mexico," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 324-346.
    7. Bukhvalov, A. & Alekseeva, O., 2016. "International joint venture acquisition by a foreign or local partner," Working Papers 6439, Graduate School of Management, St. Petersburg State University.
    8. Habib, Michel A. & Mella-Barral, Pierre, 2013. "Skills, core capabilities, and the choice between merging, allying, and trading assets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 31-48.
    9. Spencer A. Case & D. Scott Lee & John D. Martin, 2007. "The potential for expropriation through joint ventures," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(1), pages 111-126.
    10. Case, Spencer A. & Lee, D. Scott & Martin, John D., 2007. "The potential for expropriation through joint ventures," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 111-126.
    11. Lai, Jung-Ho & Chen, Li-Yu & Chen, Carl R., 2017. "Agency hazard, managerial incentives, and the wealth effects of joint venture investments," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 190-202.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Continuous-Time Corporate Finance; Joint Ventures; Knowhow Acquisition; Optimal Dissolution Time; Continuous-Time Corporate Finance.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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