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Xenophobia and distribution in France : A politico-economic analysis

Author

Listed:
  • John Roemer

    (Yale University [New Haven])

  • Karine Van Der Straeten

    (PSE - La plante et son environnement - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INA P-G - Institut National Agronomique Paris-Grignon - UP11 - Université Paris-Sud - Paris 11 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

Abstract

We study the effect of anti-immigrant sentiments among voters on the equilibrium position of political parties on the economic issue. We model political competition as taking place among three parties (Left, Right, and Extreme Right) on a two-dimensional policy space (economic issue, immigration issue) using an extension of the Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium concept. We "calibrate" the model to French survey data for the election years 1988 and 2002, and show that the immigration issue influences equilibrium on the economic issue in a significant way.

Suggested Citation

  • John Roemer & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2004. "Xenophobia and distribution in France : A politico-economic analysis," Working Papers hal-00242934, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242934
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00242934
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lee, Woojin & Roemer, John E., 2006. "Racism and redistribution in the United States: A solution to the problem of American exceptionalism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1027-1052, August.
    2. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
    3. David Austen-Smith & Michael Wallerstein, 2003. "Redistribution in a Divided Society," Discussion Papers 1362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Jack High (ed.), 2001. "Competition," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1751.
    5. Alberto Alesina & Edward Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "Why Doesn't The US Have a European-Style Welfare State?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1933, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Erik Lindqvist & Robert Östling, 2013. "Identity and redistribution," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 469-491, June.
    2. Anesi, Vincent & De Donder, Philippe, 2007. "Party Formation and Racism," CEPR Discussion Papers 6281, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Holger Stichnoth, 2012. "Does immigration weaken natives’ support for the unemployed? Evidence from Germany," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 631-654, June.
    4. Stichnoth, Holger, 2010. "Does immigration weaken natives' support for the welfare state? Evidence from Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 10-008, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Equilibre politique; Xénophobie; Immigration; Taille du secteur public; Xenophobia; Distribution; Political equilibrium;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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