IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/spmain/hal-01719518.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

État et secteur énergétique en France : quels dirigeants pour quelles relations ?

Author

Listed:
  • Scott Viallet-Thevenin

    (CSO - Centre de sociologie des organisations (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Since the end of the 1980s the state has been engaged in a withdrawal from the management of nationalized businesses. The institutional environment for industrial firms has changed considerably as a result. Firms have internationalized and a number of markets have been liberalized. What has been the result of these changes for relations between the state and big business? In this article I set out to respond to this question looking at the case of the energy sector, in which the state has played a large role as a shareholder since the beginning of the 1990s. Considering the managers of the largest firms in this sector to be business resources, I will identify the strategies implemented by these firms, which reveal recourse to the state and notably the political sphere. The changes to the social properties of the energy sector managers have proceeded in two directions during the last two decades. The firms have it both ways, exhibiting both their independence from the state through administrative boards, while reinforcing informal ties with the political sphere through their executive committees.

Suggested Citation

  • Scott Viallet-Thevenin, 2015. "État et secteur énergétique en France : quels dirigeants pour quelles relations ?," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01719518, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-01719518
    DOI: 10.3917/rfs.563.0469
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01719518v2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01719518v2/document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3917/rfs.563.0469?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Byrd, Daniel T. & Mizruchi, Mark S., 2005. "Bankers on the board and the debt ratio of firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 129-173, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Giacomo Cau & Massimiliano Stacchini, 2010. "The certification role of bank directors on;corporate boards," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 46, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
    2. Min Jung Kang & Y. Han (Andy) Kim & Qunfeng Liao, 2020. "Do bankers on the board reduce crash risk?," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 26(3), pages 684-723, June.
    3. Ren, Shenggang & Cheng, Yingmei & Hu, Yucai & Yin, Chao, 2021. "Feeling right at home: Hometown CEOs and firm innovation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    4. Cristi A. Gleason & Sascha Kieback & Martin Thomsen & Christoph Watrin, 2021. "Monitoring or payroll maximization? What happens when workers enter the boardroom?," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 1046-1087, September.
    5. Pan, Xiaofei & Tian, Gary Gang, 2015. "Does banks’ dual holding affect bank lending and firms’ investment decisions? Evidence from China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 406-424.
    6. Anjos, Fernando & Kang, Chang-Mo, 2017. "Managerial myopia, financial expertise, and executive-firm matching," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 464-479.
    7. Renee B. Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2010. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 58-107, March.
    8. Tristan Auvray & Olivier Brossard, 2013. "French connection: interlocking directorates and the ownership-control nexus in an insider governance system," Working Papers hal-00842582, HAL.
    9. Ghosh, Saibal, 2016. "Banker on board and innovative activity," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(10), pages 4205-4214.
    10. Qiang Li & Wenjuan Ruan & Huimin Shi & Erwei Xiang & Feida (Frank) Zhang, 2022. "Corporate environmental information disclosure and bank financing: Moderating effect of formal and informal institutions," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(7), pages 2931-2946, November.
    11. Lei Xu & Qian Liu & Bin Li & Chen Ma, 2022. "Fintech business and firm access to bank loans," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(4), pages 4381-4421, December.
    12. Li, Zhe & Rainville, Megan, 2021. "Do Military Independent Directors Improve Firm Performance?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 43(C).
    13. HaiYan Yang & Daifei (Troy) Yao & Xin Qu, 2022. "How does independent directors’ reputation influence pay‐for‐performance? Evidence from China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(1), pages 959-1007, March.
    14. Biswas, Shreya & Kumar, Rajnish, 2022. "Bank board network and financial stability in emerging markets," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(PB).
    15. Min Jung Kang & Andy (Y. Han) Kim, 2017. "Bankers on the Board and CEO Incentives," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 23(2), pages 292-324, March.
    16. Maug, Ernst & Dittmann, Ingolf & Schneider, Christoph, 2007. "Bankers and the Performance of German Firms," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-40, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    17. Carola Frydman & Eric Hilt, 2014. "Investment Banks as Corporate Monitors in the Early 20th Century United States," NBER Working Papers 20544, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. ROMMENS, An & CUYVERS, Ludo & DELOOF, Marc, 2007. "Interlocking directorates and business groups: Belgian evidence," Working Papers 2007023, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    19. Joao Amaro de Matos & Joao Mergulhao, 2015. "Debt, information asymmetry and bankers on board," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp597, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    20. Guglielmo Barone & Litterio Mirenda & Sauro Mocetti, 2021. "Losing My Connection: The Dark Side of Bank–Firm Interlocking Directorates," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 88(350), pages 474-498, April.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-01719518. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Contact - Sciences Po Departement of Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.