Taxation and the international strategy of Japanese multinational enterprises
This paper analyzes the effect of statutory tax rates on the location of Japanese capital in emerging countries. Considering the fact that the difference between Japan and foreign tax rates can engender transfer pricing manipulation to diminish tax liabilities, and that some firms are more able to manipulate transfer pricing, such as wholly-owned ventures and high technology affiliates, we investigate the sensitivity of Japanese capital to foreign tax rates by distinguishing wholly-owned ventures from joint-ventures and high R&D affiliates from low R&D affiliates. Based on country, parent firm and sector characteristics an investment equation is estimated on a sample of 3774 Japanese affiliates in 49 emerging countries. We obtain a greater semi-elasticity between investment and the statutory tax rate for wholly-owned affiliates and R&D intensive parents. We interpret these results as indirect evidence for abusive transfer pricing to be one of the determinants of FDI flows.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2006|
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|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00590421|
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