IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00533084.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Regulating the financial analysis industry : Is the European Directive effective ?

Author

Listed:
  • M. Dubois

    (Institut d'analyse financière - UNINE - Université de Neuchâtel = University of Neuchatel)

  • Pascal Dumontier

    (CERAG - Centre d'études et de recherches appliquées à la gestion - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In the recent years, the US and the EC have witnessed the adoption of new regulations focused on financial analysts. This study investigates whether the European regulations, known as the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) changed the distribution of recommendations and increased their credibility...

Suggested Citation

  • M. Dubois & Pascal Dumontier, 2009. "Regulating the financial analysis industry : Is the European Directive effective ?," Post-Print halshs-00533084, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00533084
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00533084
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00533084/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Patricia C. O'Brien & Maureen F. Mcnichols & Lin Hsiou‐Wei, 2005. "Analyst Impartiality and Investment Banking Relationships," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(4), pages 623-650, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Régis BRETON & Sébastien GALANTI & Christophe HURLIN & Anne-Gaël VAUBOURG, 2011. "Does the firm-analyst relationship matter in explaining analysts' earnings forecast errors?," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 469, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    2. Lauren Cohen & Andrea Frazzini & Christopher J. Malloy, 2012. "Hiring Cheerleaders: Board Appointments of "Independent" Directors," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(6), pages 1039-1058, June.
    3. Mola, Simona & Guidolin, Massimo, 2009. "Affiliated mutual funds and analyst optimism," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 108-137, July.
    4. Galanti, Sébastien & Vaubourg, Anne Gaël, 2017. "Optimism bias in financial analysts' earnings forecasts: Do commissions sharing agreements reduce conflicts of interest?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 325-337.
    5. Mehran, Hamid & Stulz, Rene M., 2007. "The economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 267-296, August.
    6. Bing Wang & Kung‐Cheng Ho & Xinyu Liu & Yan Gu, 2022. "Industry cash flow volatility and stock price crash risk," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(2), pages 356-371, March.
    7. Zhang, Chao & Shrider, David G. & Han, Dun & Wu, Yanran, 2022. "Accurate forecasts attract clients; Biased forecasts keep them happy," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    8. Gus De Franco & S.P. Kothari & Rodrigo S. Verdi, 2011. "The Benefits of Financial Statement Comparability," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(4), pages 895-931, September.
    9. Chen, Lei & Danbolt, Jo & Holland, John, 2018. "Information about bank intangibles, analyst information intermediation, and the role of knowledge and social forces in the ‘market for information’," Accounting forum, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 261-276.
    10. Sébastien GALANTI, 2008. "When the payment mode affects the quality of advices. Financial analysts, fund managers, and brokerage commissions," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 1767, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    11. Bradley, Daniel, 2018. "Discussion of “analyst stock ownership and stock recommendations”," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 499-505.
    12. Chang, Eric C. & Lin, Tse-Chun & Ma, Xiaorong, 2019. "Does short-selling threat discipline managers in mergers and acquisitions decisions?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1).
    13. Boris Groysberg & Paul Healy & George Serafeim & Devin Shanthikumar, 2013. "The Stock Selection and Performance of Buy-Side Analysts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(5), pages 1062-1075, May.
    14. Adam Zaremba & Przemys³aw Konieczka, 2015. "The Profitability Of Following Analyst Recommendations On The Polish Stock Market," "e-Finanse", University of Information Technology and Management, Institute of Financial Research and Analysis, vol. 11(1), pages 22-31, August.
    15. Gu, Zhaoyang & Xue, Jian, 2008. "The superiority and disciplining role of independent analysts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 289-316, August.
    16. Gus De Franco & Hai Lu & Florin P. Vasvari, 2007. "Wealth Transfer Effects of Analysts' Misleading Behavior," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 71-110, March.
    17. Ramnath, Sundaresh & Rock, Steve & Shane, Philip, 2008. "The financial analyst forecasting literature: A taxonomy with suggestions for further research," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 34-75.
    18. Peter Clarkson & Alexander Nekrasov & Andreas Simon & Irene Tutticci, 2020. "Target price forecasts: The roles of the 52‐week high price and recent investor sentiment," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(9-10), pages 1365-1399, October.
    19. Kim, Yongtae & Lobo, Gerald J. & Song, Minsup, 2011. "Analyst characteristics, timing of forecast revisions, and analyst forecasting ability," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(8), pages 2158-2168, August.
    20. Song, Kyojik “Roy” & Mantecon, Tomas & Altintig, Z. Ayca, 2012. "Chaebol-affiliated analysts: Conflicts of interest and market responses," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 584-596.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00533084. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.