Mergers, cartels and leniency programs : the role of production capacities
In this paper, we study the impact of a merger on collusion depending on the endowment of capital asset among firms. We show that the merger makes the collusion easier to sustain when asymmetric capital stock combines with less efficient insiders because of more symmetric conditions and closer incentive constraints. Moreover, this model allows us to determinean optimal threshold of asymmetry among insiders and outsiders such as a merger has pro-competitive effects and we compare this value with the value which would restore perfect symmetry between firms after the merger.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Working paper GATE 08-14. 2008|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00303671|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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- Massimo Motta & Michele Polo, .
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