Do Standard-Essential Patent Owners Behave Opportunistically? Evidence from U.S. District Court Dockets
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DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahad010
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04547832
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- Brian J Love & Yassine Lefouili & Christian Helmers, 2023. "Do Standard-Essential Patent Owners Behave Opportunistically? Evidence From U.S. District Court Dockets," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 25(1), pages 300-337.
- Love, Brian & Lefouili, Yassine & Helmers, Christian, 2020. "Do Standard-Essential Patent Owners Behave Opportunistically? Evidence from U.S. District Court Dockets," TSE Working Papers 20-1160, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Litigation; Standards; Patents; Holdup; U.S;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
- O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2024-05-27 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-INO-2024-05-27 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2024-05-27 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-LAW-2024-05-27 (Law and Economics)
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