IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01793701.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Incentives for productivity, efficiency and usefulness in public sector research : the process involved and their possible failures
[Les mécanismes d'incitation à la productivité, à l'efficience et à l'utilité dans la recherche publique. Une analyse des processus en jeu et de leurs défaillances possibles]

Author

Listed:
  • Sylvie Bonny

    () (ECO-PUB - Economie Publique - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AgroParisTech, INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

Abstract

Using agency/contract theory, among other tools, this paper analyses the mechanisms that coordinate public sector research with social demand. The characteristics of public sector research and the importance of informational asymmetry in this field are outlined. The various incentive mechanisms that can ensure a certain level of productivity and efficiency from public sector research workers are examined (pressure to publish, priority rule, competition, etc.), with their advantages and disadvantages (over-specialization of scientists and the very narrow focus of most research, for example). The questions "whom is public research useful to?" and "what is the direction of the work?" are then examined. The issues of the circulation of knowledge and property law in this field are also discussed, as well as utilization of science results. In the conclusion some pointers are mentioned to improve the mechanisms that coordinate research and society.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvie Bonny, 1997. "Incentives for productivity, efficiency and usefulness in public sector research : the process involved and their possible failures
    [Les mécanismes d'incitation à la productivité, à l'efficience et
    ," Post-Print hal-01793701, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01793701
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01793701
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01793701/document
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
    3. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters,in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    5. Dominique Foray, 1991. "Economie et politique de la science: les développements théoriques récents," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 6(4), pages 53-87.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01793701. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.