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The sources of shareholder wealth gains from going private transactions: The role of controlling shareholders

Author

Listed:
  • Sabri Boubaker

  • Alexis Cellier

    (IRG - Institut de Recherche en Gestion - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12)

  • Wael Rouatbi

    (IRG - Institut de Recherche en Gestion - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12)

Abstract

The present study investigates the sources of shareholder wealth gains – as measured by cumulative abnormal returns and premiums – from going private transactions (GPTs). Using data for 314 GPTs from 18 Western European countries, we find that the announcements of GPTs generate a cumulative average abnormal return of about 22% and that pre-transaction shareholders on average receive a raw premium of about 36%. We further find that these shareholder wealth gains increase with the degree of separation of cash-flow and control rights of the pre-transaction ultimate owner and decrease with its ownership interests and with the presence of a second large shareholder. Taken together, these findings support the view that GPTs are expected to mitigate the inefficiencies induced by pre-transaction agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders. Thus, shareholder wealth gains from GPTs reflect the potential additional value that will be created under private ownership.

Suggested Citation

  • Sabri Boubaker & Alexis Cellier & Wael Rouatbi, 2014. "The sources of shareholder wealth gains from going private transactions: The role of controlling shareholders," Post-Print hal-01155449, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01155449
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    Cited by:

    1. Fang, Yuanli & Hu, Maggie & Yang, Qingsen, 2018. "Do executives benefit from shareholder disputes? Evidence from multiple large shareholders in Chinese listed firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 275-315.
    2. Hsieh, Hui-Ching & Nguyen, Dat Thanh & Nguyen, Thien Le-Hoang, 2024. "Betting on success: Unveiling the role of local gambling culture in equity crowdfunding," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    3. Sabri Boubaker & Duc Khuong Nguyen, 2018. "Governance issues in business and finance in the wake of the global financial crisis," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(1), pages 1-5, March.
    4. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-605 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Sabri Boubaker & Riadh Manita & Wael Rouatbi, 2021. "Large shareholders, control contestability and firm productive efficiency," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 296(1), pages 591-614, January.
    6. Liu, Hang & Luo, Jin-hui & Wang, Xin, 2021. "Do controlling shareholders expropriate employees? Evidence from workplace fatalities in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    7. Imen Khanchel & Naima Lassoued & Rym Gargoury, 2023. "CSR and firm value: is CSR valuable during the COVID 19 crisis in the French market?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 27(2), pages 575-601, June.
    8. Dharen Kumar Pandey & Waleed M. Al‐ahdal & Hafiza Aishah Hashim, 2024. "Stock market reaction to mandatory sustainability reporting: Does carbon‐intensity and environmental, social, and governance reputation matter?," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(8), pages 9116-9140, December.
    9. Bhaskar, Ratikant & Bansal, Shashank & Abbassi, Wajih & Pandey, Dharen Kumar, 2023. "CEO compensation and CSR: Economic implications and policy recommendations," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 232-256.
    10. Rihab Kriaa & Taher Hamza, 2021. "Control dilution of an initial owner post-IPO: the impact of characteristics of ownership structure," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 1-35, March.
    11. Wael Bousselmi & Patrick Sentis & Marc Willinger, 2018. "Impact of the Brexit vote announcement on long-run market performance," Working Papers hal-01954920, HAL.
    12. Li, Jie & Wang, Lidan & Zhou, Zhong-Qiang & Zhang, Yongjie, 2021. "Monitoring or tunneling? Information interaction among large shareholders and the crash risk of the stock price," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    13. Zeineb Barka & Taher Hamza, 2020. "The effect of large controlling shareholders on equity prices in France: monitoring or entrenchment?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 24(3), pages 769-798, September.
    14. Paulo P. Alves & M. Ricardo Cunha & Luís K. Pacheco & João M. Pinto, 2022. "How Banks Price Loans for LBOs: an Empirical Analysis of Spread Determinants ," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 62(3), pages 163-200, December.
    15. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-429 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-433 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Dasilas, Apostolos & Grose, Chris, 2018. "The wealth effects of public-to-private LBOs: Evidence from Europe," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 179-194.
    18. Thraya, Mohamed Firas & Hamza, Taher, 2019. "Bidder excess control, target overpayment and control contestability: Evidence from France," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 178-190.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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