Why Rationality May Be a Consequence of Hume's Theory of Choice
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- Marc-Arthur Diaye & Andre Lapidus, 2005. "Why rationality may be a consequence of Hume's theory of choice," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(1), pages 119-126.
References listed on IDEAS
- Sugden, Robert, 1991. "Rational Choice: A Survey of Contributions from Economics and Philosophy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(407), pages 751-785, July.
- Sugden, Robert, 1985. "Why Be Consistent? A Critical Analysis of Consistency Requirements in Choice Theory," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 52(206), pages 167-183, May.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- André Lapidus, 2011. "The Possibility of a Welfare Policy in a World of Emotion-Driven Individuals: A Humean Point of View," Post-Print hal-00538106, HAL.
- Marc-Arthur Diaye & André Lapidus, 2016. "Decision and Time from a Humean Point of View," Working Papers hal-01372527, HAL.
- Laurie Bréban, 2017. "An Investigation into the Smithian System of Sympathy: from Cognition to Emotion," Working Papers hal-01467340, HAL.
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KeywordsHume; rationality; passion; desire; will; choice; rationalité; décision; désir; préférence; volonté; choix;
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