2007 : une crise systémique ?

This article explains the 2007 crisis in the United States from the Classical Austrian Cycle theory and its recent developments. It provides three causes for the crisis: a general cause, a singular one and a systemic one. The general cause is linked to the Fed's behaviour. From 2000 to 2004 the federal bank lowered rates and artificially sustained the GDP growth of the U.S. In 2004 the Federal Bank increased its interest rate to manage inflationary pressures and higher oil prices. In 2005 the recession began and led to a negative growth in 2009. The singular cause was the subprime policy. Banks sold the subprimes but when the central bank increased its rates, borrowers were put in default and banks coped with difficulties. The systemic cause is the institution of central bank and its regulation of money supply. This institution was established in the early twentieth century to address the instability caused by the Great War and facilitate the financing of public spending through inflation tax. This crisis proved the fragility of these public solutions and their undesirable effects on the socialization of risk. It raises questions about the need to initiate a comprehensive reform of the system and introduce of real competition among currencies.