Competition and Interest Rate Ceilings in Commerical Banking
Regulations prohibiting the payment of explicit interest on demand deposits are gradually being eased. As banks switch from payment in the form of free services to explicit interest, both the level of money demand and the response of money demand to market interest rates will change. Banks are modeled here as being Chamberlinian monopolistic competitors. Equilibrium deposit interest rate relationships are found for markets both with and without an effective interest rate ceiling and the behavior of the two markets is compared. The elimination of deposit interest rate ceilings leads to increased money demand and an increased responsiveness of deposit rates to market interest rates.
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