A Model of Child Labor
The authors build a model of child labor and study its implication for welfare and fertility. Assuming there is a trade-off between child labor and human capital accumulation, we derive conditions under which child labor is socially inefficient. Even if parents are altruistic, child labor may arise in equilibrium because of commitment problem stemming from the fact that parents control child but not adult income.
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|Date of creation:||1998|
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Web page: http://www.fundp.ac.be/facultes/eco/
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