Government debt, output, and asymmetric information
Recent explanation of monetary policy and its effect have centered upon a non-cooperative game involving the monetary authority and the private sector. Notably absent from the discussion of asymmetric information and its impact on decision making is fiscal policy. This note examines a simple model where the fiscal authority determines the optimal ratio of permanent to total government debt based on explicit optimizing behavior. Deficit financing can have short-run effects because of uncertainty concerning future fiscal policy. However, in the long run, changes in net private sector wealth due to government financing policies do not affect private sector behavior.
|Date of creation:||1987|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.stlouisfed.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1983. "On the Relevance or Irrelevance of Public Financial Policy," NBER Working Papers 1057, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedlwp:1987-003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anna Xiao)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.