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Monetary Policy, Uncertainty, and Communications

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Abstract

We review the design and communication of monetary policy strategies that take into account risks and uncertainty. A key element in a robust monetary strategy is the concept of risk management, which is the weighing of key risks when setting policy. When risks to the outlook are balanced, the baseline outlook may be sufficient to guide policy decisions. However, risk-management considerations become important when risks are asymmetric. We discuss how robust simple interest rate rules and optimal control policy can incorporate risk-management considerations into the design of a monetary policy strategy. Alternative scenarios can illustrate salient risks and how monetary policy might respond if those risks were to materialize. However, using alternative scenarios in policy deliberations and communications requires important implementation choices.

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  • Vaishali Garga & Edward P. Herbst & Alisdair McKay & Giovanni Nicolo & Matthias Paustian, 2025. "Monetary Policy, Uncertainty, and Communications," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2025-074, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2025-74
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2025.074
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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