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Do self-insurance and disability insurance prevent consumption loss on disability?

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  • Steffan G. Ball
  • Hamish W. Low

Abstract

In this paper we show the extent to which public insurance and self-insurance mitigate the cost of health shocks that limit the ability to work. We use consumption data from the UK to estimate the insurance provided by the government disability programme and account for the effectiveness of alternative self-insurance mechanisms. Individuals with a work-limiting health condition, but in receipt of disability insurance, have 7 percent lower consumption than those without such a condition. Self-insurance through savings and a working partner each provide some insurance benefit, improving outcomes from 2 percent to 4 percent. Reductions in the generosity of incapacity benefit after 1995 are associated with increases in the consumption loss associated with disability.

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  • Steffan G. Ball & Hamish W. Low, 2009. "Do self-insurance and disability insurance prevent consumption loss on disability?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2009-31, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2009-31
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    Cited by:

    1. Fadlon, Itzik & Nielsen, Torben Heien, 2019. "Household labor supply and the gains from social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 18-28.
    2. Andreas Haller & Stefan Staubli & Josef Zweimüller, 2024. "Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(1), pages 79-110, January.
    3. Hamish Low & Luigi Pistaferri, 2020. "Disability Insurance: Theoretical Trade‐Offs and Empirical Evidence," Fiscal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(1), pages 129-164, March.
    4. Kolsrud, Jonas & Landais, Camille & Spinnewijn, Johannes, 2020. "The value of registry data for consumption analysis: An application to health shocks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    5. Bruce Meyer & Wallace K. C. Mok, 2016. "Disability, Earnings, Income and Consumption," NBER Chapters, in: Social Insurance Programs (Trans-Atlantic Public Economics Seminar, TAPES), National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Hamish Low & Luigi Pistaferri, 2015. "Disability Insurance and the Dynamics of the Incentive Insurance Trade-Off," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(10), pages 2986-3029, October.
    7. Chiara Dal Bianco, 2019. "Labour Supply and Welfare Effects of Disability Insurance: A Survey," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 5(1), pages 161-189, March.
    8. Rennane, Stephanie, 2020. "A double safety net? Understanding interactions between disability benefits, formal assistance, and family support," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    9. Dalton, Michael & LaFave, Daniel, 2017. "Mitigating the consequences of a health condition: The role of intra- and interhousehold assistance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 38-52.

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