IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fda/fdaddt/2011-03.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On the Utility Representation of Asymmetric Single-Peaked Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Francisco Martínez-Mora
  • M. Socorro Puy

Abstract

We introduce two natural types of asymmetric single-peaked preferences, which we name biased-above and biased-below, depending on whether the asymmetry (or preference-bias) favors alternatives above or below the peak. We define a rich family of utility functions, the generalized distance-metric utility functions, that can represent preferences biased-above or biased-below, besides accommodating any degree of asymmetry. We also identify restrictions on differentiable utility representations that guarantee the underlying preferences to be biased-above or below, and allow to compare degrees of asymmetry. Finally, we consider a specific application -agents preferences over government size- to illustrate the role of factors such as risk aversion and tax distortions in shaping asymmetric preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Martínez-Mora & M. Socorro Puy, 2011. "On the Utility Representation of Asymmetric Single-Peaked Preferences," Working Papers 2011-03, FEDEA.
    • Handle: RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2011-03
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://documentos.fedea.net/pubs/dt/2011/dt-2011-03.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J, 2003. "Inflation Targeting under Asymmetric Preferences," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(5), pages 763-785, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pierdzioch, Christian & Rülke, Jan-Christoph & Stadtmann, Georg, 2015. "Central banks’ inflation forecasts under asymmetric loss: Evidence from four Latin-American countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 66-70.
    2. repec:pri:cepsud:83svensson is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Weitzman Nagar, 2007. "Asymmetry in Monetary Policy: An Asymmetric Objective Function and a New-Keynesian Model," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2007.02, Bank of Israel.
    4. Helle Bunzel & Walter Enders, 2010. "The Taylor Rule and "Opportunistic" Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(5), pages 931-949, August.
    5. Libman, Emiliano, 2017. "Asymmetric Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies in Latin America," MPRA Paper 78864, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Vítor Castro, 2008. "Are Central Banks following a linear or nonlinear (augmented) Taylor rule?," NIPE Working Papers 19/2008, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    7. Lee, Dong Jin & Son, Jong Chil, 2013. "Nonlinearity and structural breaks in monetary policy rules with stock prices," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 1-11.
    8. Srinivasan, Naveen & Jain, Sumit & Ramachandran, M., 2009. "Monetary policy and the behaviour of inflation in India: Is there a need for institutional reform?," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 13-24, January.
    9. Martínez-Mora, Francisco & Puy, M. Socorro, 2014. "The determinants and electoral consequences of asymmetric preferences," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 85-97.
    10. David Kiefer, 2013. "Are governments able to lean against the macroeconomic wind?," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah 2013_14, University of Utah, Department of Economics.
    11. Caglayan, Mustafa & Jehan, Zainab & Mouratidis, Kostas, 2012. "Asymmetric monetary policy rules for open economies: Evidence from four countries," MPRA Paper 37401, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Dave, Chetan & Feigenbaum, James, 2020. "Precautionary Learning And Inflationary Biases," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 24(5), pages 1124-1150, July.
    13. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2002. "Monetary policy and real stabilization," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 261-312.
    14. Jon Eguia, 2013. "On the spatial representation of preference profiles," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 103-128, January.
    15. ZHENG, Tingguo & WANG, Xia & GUO, Huiming, 2012. "Estimating forward-looking rules for China's Monetary Policy: A regime-switching perspective," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 47-59.
    16. David Andolfatto & Scott Hendry & Kevin Moran, 2002. "Inflation Expectations and Learning about Monetary Policy," Staff Working Papers 02-30, Bank of Canada.
    17. Libich Jan, 2011. "Inflation Nutters? Modelling the Flexibility of Inflation Targeting," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-36, June.
    18. Kishor, N. Kundan, 2012. "A Note On Time Variation In A Forward-Looking Monetary Policy Rule: Evidence From European Countries," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(S3), pages 422-437, November.
    19. Scott, C. Patrick, 2016. "Asymmetric preferences and monetary policy deviations," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 325-334.
    20. Della Posta, Pompeo & Tamborini, Roberto, 2023. "Does an inflation target zone help or hinder price stability?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    21. Pierre St-Amant & David Tessier, 2000. "Résultats empiriques multi-pays relatifs à l'impact des cibles d'inflation sur la crédibilité de la politique monétaire," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 26(3), pages 295-310, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2011-03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Carmen Arias (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.fedea.net .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.