IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fda/fdaddt/2011-03.html

On the Utility Representation of Asymmetric Single-Peaked Preferences

Author

Listed:
  • Francisco Martínez-Mora
  • M. Socorro Puy

Abstract

We introduce two natural types of asymmetric single-peaked preferences, which we name biased-above and biased-below, depending on whether the asymmetry (or preference-bias) favors alternatives above or below the peak. We define a rich family of utility functions, the generalized distance-metric utility functions, that can represent preferences biased-above or biased-below, besides accommodating any degree of asymmetry. We also identify restrictions on differentiable utility representations that guarantee the underlying preferences to be biased-above or below, and allow to compare degrees of asymmetry. Finally, we consider a specific application -agents preferences over government size- to illustrate the role of factors such as risk aversion and tax distortions in shaping asymmetric preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Martínez-Mora & M. Socorro Puy, 2011. "On the Utility Representation of Asymmetric Single-Peaked Preferences," Working Papers 2011-03, FEDEA.
    • Handle: RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2011-03
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://documentos.fedea.net/pubs/dt/2011/dt-2011-03.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J, 2003. "Inflation Targeting under Asymmetric Preferences," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(5), pages 763-785, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pierdzioch, Christian & Rülke, Jan-Christoph & Stadtmann, Georg, 2015. "Central banks’ inflation forecasts under asymmetric loss: Evidence from four Latin-American countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 66-70.
    2. repec:pri:cepsud:83svensson is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Weitzman Nagar, 2007. "Asymmetry in Monetary Policy: An Asymmetric Objective Function and a New-Keynesian Model," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2007.02, Bank of Israel.
    4. Hamid Baghestani & Bassam Abual-Foul, 2010. "Evidence on Forecasting Inflation Under Asymmetric Loss," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 55(1), pages 105-110, May.
    5. Libman, Emiliano, 2017. "Asymmetric Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies in Latin America," MPRA Paper 78864, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Demosthenes N. Tambakis, 2007. "Fear of Floating and Social Welfare," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(3), pages 183-204, September.
    7. Castro, Vitor, "undated". "Are Central Banks following a linear or nonlinear (augmented) Taylor rule?," Economic Research Papers 269883, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    8. Srinivasan, Naveen & Jain, Sumit & Ramachandran, M., 2009. "Monetary policy and the behaviour of inflation in India: Is there a need for institutional reform?," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 13-24, January.
    9. Martínez-Mora, Francisco & Puy, M. Socorro, 2014. "The determinants and electoral consequences of asymmetric preferences," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 85-97.
    10. David Kiefer, 2013. "Are governments able to lean against the macroeconomic wind?," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah 2013_14, University of Utah, Department of Economics.
    11. Caglayan, Mustafa & Jehan, Zainab & Mouratidis, Kostas, 2012. "Asymmetric monetary policy rules for open economies: Evidence from four countries," MPRA Paper 37401, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Naveen Srinivasan & Vidya Mahambare & M. Ramachandran, 2006. "UK monetary policy under inflation forecast targeting: is behaviour consistent with symmetric preferences?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(4), pages 706-721, October.
    13. Thanaset Chevapatrakul & Juan Paez-Farrell, 2014. "Monetary Policy Reaction Functions in Small Open Economies: a Quantile Regression Approach," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 82(2), pages 237-256, March.
    14. Fernandes, Leonardo H.S. & Silva, José W.L. & de Araujo, Fernando H.A., 2022. "Multifractal risk measures by Macroeconophysics perspective: The case of Brazilian inflation dynamics," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    15. Wang, Xia & Zheng, Tingguo & Zhu, Yanli, 2014. "Money–output Granger causal dynamics in China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 192-200.
    16. International Monetary Fund, 2005. "Inflation Targeting and Output Growth: Empirical Evidence for the European Union," IMF Working Papers 2005/089, International Monetary Fund.
    17. Turdaliev, Nurlan, 2010. "Communication in repeated monetary policy games," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 228-243, April.
    18. Paolo Surico, 2002. "Inflation Targeting and Nonlinear Policy Rules: the Case of Asymmetric Preferences," Macroeconomics 0210002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Feb 2004.
    19. Capistrán, Carlos, 2008. "Bias in Federal Reserve inflation forecasts: Is the Federal Reserve irrational or just cautious?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(8), pages 1415-1427, November.
    20. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2002. "Monetary policy and real stabilization," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 261-312.
    21. Jon Eguia, 2013. "On the spatial representation of preference profiles," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 103-128, January.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2011-03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Marta Fernández (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.fedea.net .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.