IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ess/wpaper/id289.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Multilateral Solutions to the Erosion of Non-Reciprocal Preferences in NAMA

Author

Listed:
  • Roberta Piermartini
  • Patrick Low
  • Jurgen Richtering

Abstract

This paper analyzes the risks of preference erosion arising from MFN trade liberalization in manufactured products. It focuses on developing countries that receive non-reciprocal preferences in the markets of United States, EU, Japan, Canada and Australia. The paper estimates preference margins as the difference between non-reciprocal preferential rates received by individual countries and the best available (MFN or better-than-MFN) treatment received on average by all other suppliers. Most previous work on this subject has compared the preferential rates for individual countries with MFN rates alone, which the paper found to have the effect of over-stating the margin at risk from erosion following MFN reductions.The paper finds that developing countries as a whole do not loose from preference erosion following MFN liberalization, although significant gains and losses underlie the estimate of the average. Almost all least-developed countries either lose from preference erosion or are unaffected by it because their exports are already largely MFN duty-free.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberta Piermartini & Patrick Low & Jurgen Richtering, 2005. "Multilateral Solutions to the Erosion of Non-Reciprocal Preferences in NAMA," Working Papers id:289, eSocialSciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:289
    Note: Institutional Papers
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.esocialsciences.org/Download/repecDownload.aspx?fname=Document119122005210.8898584.doc&fcategory=Articles&AId=289&fref=repec
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. José Anson & Olivier Cadot & Antoni Estevadeordal & Jaime de Melo & Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann & Bolormaa Tumurchudur, 2005. "Rules of Origin in North-South Preferential Trading Arrangements with an Application to NAFTA," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 501-517, August.
    2. Fabien Candau & Sébastien Jean, 2005. "What Are EU Trade Preferences Worth for Sub-Saharan Africa and Other Developing Countries?," Working Papers 2005-19, CEPII research center.
    3. Paul Brenton & Miriam Manchin, 2003. "Making EU Trade Agreements Work: The Role of Rules of Origin," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(5), pages 755-769, May.
    4. Olivier Cadot & Antoni Estevadeordal & Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann, 2004. "Rules of origin as export subsidies," Research Unit Working Papers 0405, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA.
    5. Grossman, Gene M. & Sykes, Alan O., 2005. "A preference for development: the law and economics of GSP," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(01), pages 41-67, March.
    6. Marc J. Melitz, 2003. "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1695-1725, November.
    7. Anne O. Krueger, 1993. "Free Trade Agreements as Protectionist Devices: Rules of Origin," NBER Working Papers 4352, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Brenton, Paul, 2003. "Integrating the least developed countries into the world trading system : the current impact of EU preferences under everything but arms," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3018, The World Bank.
    9. Ozden, Caglar & Reinhardt, Eric, 2005. "The perversity of preferences: GSP and developing country trade policies, 1976-2000," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 1-21, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Escaith, Hubert & Tamenu, Bekele, 2013. "Least-Developed Countries' Trade During the "Super-Cycle" and the Great Trade Collapse: Patterns and Stylized Facts," MPRA Paper 51997, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Lawrence, Robert Z. & Rosito, Tatiana, 2006. "A New Compensation Mechanism for Preference Erosion in the Doha Round," Working Paper Series rwp06-044, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    3. Sharma, Anupa & Grant, Jason & Boys, Kathryn, 2015. "Truly Preferential Treatment? Reconsidering the Generalized System of (Trade) Preferences," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 205890, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association;Western Agricultural Economics Association.
    4. Lawrence, Robert Z. & Rosito, Tatiana, 2006. "A New Compensation Mechanism for Preference Erosion in the Doha Round," Working Paper Series rwp06-044, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    5. Sam LAIRD, 2007. "Aid for Trade: Cool Aid or Kool-Aid?," G-24 Discussion Papers 48, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
    6. Paul Collier & Anthony J. Venables, 2007. "Rethinking Trade Preferences: How Africa Can Diversify its Exports," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(8), pages 1326-1345, August.
    7. Fugazza, Marco, 2007. "A new geography of preferences for Sub-Saharan African countries in a globalizing trading system," MPRA Paper 11575, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:289. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Padma Prakash). General contact details of provider: http://www.esocialsciences.org .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.