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VIllage Economics and the Structure of Extended Family Networks

  • Manuela Angelucci

    ()

  • Giacomo de Giorgi

    ()

  • Marcos A Rangel

    ()

  • Imran Rasul

    ()

This paper documents how the structure of extended family networks in rural Mexico relates to the poverty and inequality of the village of residence. Using the Hispanic naming convention, within-village extended family networks in 504 poor rural villages are constructed. Family networks are larger (both in the number of members and as a share of the village population) and out-migration is lower the poorer and the less unequal the village of residence.

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Paper provided by eSocialSciences in its series Working Papers with number id:2301.

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Date of creation: Nov 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2301
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