IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/erg/wpaper/2040.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Incentive-Based Regulations and Bank Restructuring in Egypt

Author

Listed:
  • Alaa El-Shazly

    (Cairo University)

Abstract

The Egyptian authorities undertook major banking reforms in the 1990s to create a more efficient financial system. These reforms included the strengthening of bank supervision and regulations on the basis of internationally accepted standards, to deal with the risks inherent in the new policy environment. This paper looks at banking regulatory policy in Egypt and the incentive schemes to foster healthy competition and ensure financial stability. It highlights the impediments to stronger enforcement mechanisms and considers various schemes for monitoring bank behavior under informational asymmetries, while also looking at the design of incentive-compatible safety nets. The paper also investigates the microeconomic evidence for the 1991-1998 period - on the existence of market discipline with a model that relates deposit growth as a measure of market discipline to bank asset risk and solvency measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Alaa El-Shazly, 2000. "Incentive-Based Regulations and Bank Restructuring in Egypt," Working Papers 2040, Economic Research Forum, revised 12 2000.
    • Handle: RePEc:erg:wpaper:2040
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://erf.org.eg/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2040-Shazly-web.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://bit.ly/2sgFWft
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charles W. Calomiris & Andrew Powell, 2000. "Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina, 1992-1999," NBER Working Papers 7715, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Mr. Charles Enoch, 1997. "Transparency and Ambiguity in Central Bank Safety Net Operations," IMF Working Papers 1997/138, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Xavier Vives, 2002. "Réglementation nationale et mondialisation : le cas des marchés financiers," Revue d’économie du développement, De Boeck Université, vol. 10(1), pages 141-169.
    2. Xavier Vives, 2006. "Banking and Regulation in Emerging Markets: The Role of External Discipline," The World Bank Research Observer, World Bank, vol. 21(2), pages 179-206.
    3. Michael Brei & Carlos Winograd, 2012. "Foreign banks, corporate strategy and financial stability: lessons from the river plate," PSE Working Papers halshs-00703738, HAL.
    4. Michael Brei & Carlos Winograd, 2012. "Foreign banks, corporate strategy and financial stability: lessons from the river plate," Working Papers halshs-00703738, HAL.
    5. Mikel Bedayo & Gabriel Jiménez & José-Luis Peydró & Raquel Vegas, 2020. "Screening and Loan Origination Time: Lending Standards, Loan Defaults and Bank Failures," Working Papers 1215, Barcelona School of Economics.
    6. Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti & Robert Marquez, 2011. "Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(4), pages 983-1018.
    7. Gropp, R. & Grundl, C. & Guttler, A., 2012. "Does Discretion in Lending Increase Bank Risk? Borrower Self-Selection and Loan Officer Capture Effects," Other publications TiSEM bfec5360-2a2b-47e4-ba3f-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Ernest Dautovic, 2019. "Has Regulatory Capital Made Banks Safer? Skin in the Game vs Moral Hazard," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 19.03, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    9. Ongena, Steven & Savaşer, Tanseli & Şişli Ciamarra, Elif, 2022. "CEO incentives and bank risk over the business cycle," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    10. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/4vc7skecu3q7u7s984pi2eaan is not listed on IDEAS
    11. González, Luis Otero & Razia, Alaa & Búa, Milagros Vivel & Sestayo, Rubén Lado, 2017. "Competition, concentration and risk taking in Banking sector of MENA countries," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 591-604.
    12. Risfandy, Tastaftiyan & Tarazi, Amine & Trinugroho, Irwan, 2022. "Competition in dual markets: Implications for banking system stability," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    13. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2011. "Bank size and risk-taking under Basel II," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1436-1449, June.
    14. Suarez, Javier & Sánchez Serrano, Antonio, 2018. "Approaching non-performing loans from a macroprudential angle," Report of the Advisory Scientific Committee 7, European Systemic Risk Board.
    15. Wang, Jiamei & Chen, Haibin & Zhang, Heng & Luo, Jianchao & Cheng, Mingwang & Zhang, Jiaping, 2022. "Property rights reform and capital adequacy ratios of rural credit cooperatives in China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    16. Guidi, Francesco, 2021. "Concentration, competition and financial stability in the South-East Europe banking context," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 639-670.
    17. Iosifidi, Maria & Kokas, Sotirios, 2015. "Who lends to riskier and lower-profitability firms? Evidence from the syndicated loan market," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(S1), pages 14-21.
    18. Alexander, Gordon J. & Baptista, Alexandre M. & Yan, Shu, 2013. "A comparison of the original and revised Basel market risk frameworks for regulating bank capital," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 249-268.
    19. Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena & Marquez, Robert, 2015. "Deposits and bank capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(3), pages 601-619.
    20. Anupam Das Gupta & Syed Moudud-Ul-Huq, 2020. "Do competition and revenue diversification have significant effect on risk-taking? Empirical evidence from BRICS banks," International Journal of Financial Engineering (IJFE), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 7(01), pages 1-28, March.
    21. Viral V. Acharya & Hanh T. Le & Hyun Song Shin, 2017. "Bank Capital and Dividend Externalities," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(3), pages 988-1018.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:erg:wpaper:2040. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sherine Ghoneim (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/erfaceg.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.