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Review of the Payment Services Directive: The question of surcharges

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  • Pyykko, Elina

Abstract

The Payment Services Directive was intended to provide more price transparency for users and a level playing field for efficient competition among different payment services by decreasing the inhibiting effects of different legislation, cross-subsidisation and non-cost-based pricing. The European Commission, however, intended most of these effects to come about through market-led initiatives. In the run-up to the review of the Directive, Elina Pyykk� asks in this ECRI Policy Brief whether more could not be done to promote the use of efficient payment methods.

Suggested Citation

  • Pyykko, Elina, 2011. "Review of the Payment Services Directive: The question of surcharges," ECRI Papers 6290, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:eps:ecriwp:6290
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    File URL: http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/2011/10/ECRI%20PB%20No%205%20Pyykko%20on%20the%20PSD.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jonker Nicole, 2011. "Card Acceptance and Surcharging: the Role of Costs and Competition," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-35, June.
    2. Bolt, Wilko & Jonker, Nicole & van Renselaar, Corry, 2010. "Incentives at the counter: An empirical analysis of surcharging card payments and payment behaviour in the Netherlands," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(8), pages 1738-1744, August.
    3. Gans Joshua S & King Stephen P, 2003. "The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
    4. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Cooperation Among Competitors: Some Economics Of Payment Card Associations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 549-570, Winter.
    5. Wright, Julian, 2003. "Optimal card payment systems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 587-612, August.
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