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A Byzantine Agreement Protocol for Game Theorists

Author

Listed:
  • Helmuts Azacis
  • Péter Vida

    (CY Cergy Paris Université, THEMA)

Abstract

We introduce a new Byzantine agreement protocol consisting of two stages of private communication which substitutes public communication (broadcasting to all the players) in a very strong sense. At every information set, players hold the following consistent beliefs (Kreps and Wilson (1982)): every player believes, no matter what messages she has sent or received, that the bitwise-majority message of every player is the same. We provide applications of our result.

Suggested Citation

  • Helmuts Azacis & Péter Vida, 2025. "A Byzantine Agreement Protocol for Game Theorists," THEMA Working Papers 2025-04, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2025-04
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    File URL: https://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/pdf/2025-04.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1989. "Cheap Talk with Two Audiences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1214-1223, December.
    2. repec:hoo:wpaper:e-89-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
    4. repec:fth:stanho:e-89-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Geffner, Ivan & Halpern, Joseph Y., 2024. "Communication games, sequential equilibrium, and mediators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Byzantine agreement; broadcasting; public communication; consistent beliefs;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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