Not All Rivals Look Alike: An Empirical Model for Discrete Games with Asymmetric Rivals
Strong seasonality in demand, a short product life cycle, and the absence of any price competition make the release date of first-run movies one of the main strategic decisions taken by movies' distributors. Movies are typically released on a Friday within a short release season, thus making the release decision a discrete one. In estimating the discrete timing game, just as in many other competitive environments, the identity of the competing players matters: high quality movie is a tougher competitor than a low quality one. Such heterogeneity in the toughness of competition among potential rivals cannot be accommodated by the existing empirical models of discrete games. Therefore, this paper constructs a new empirical model for such games, which imposes no restrictions on the payoff structure. The model is of a sequential-move game with asymmetric information. The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game can be found using a pseudo backward introduction algorithm. The conceptual multiplicity of equilibria problem is solved for by the sequential structure, while the asymmetric information structure avoids the typical complex regions of integration, thus leading to a relative computational simplicity. By using some of the demand estimates computed in Einav (2003), the estimation results of the movie-release timing game suggest that release dates of movies are too clustered, and that too many good movies are released on holiday weekends. This suggests that more revenues could have been made by shifting some of the holiday releases by one or two weeks. Alternative explanations for these results are discussed
|Date of creation:||11 Aug 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Phone: 1 212 998 3820|
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Nevo, Aviv, 2001.
"Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry,"
Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 307-42, March.
- Nevo, Aviv, 1999. "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt7cm5p858, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Aviv Nevo, 1998. "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry," NBER Working Papers 6387, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aviv Nevo, 2003. "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry," Microeconomics 0303006, EconWPA.
- Nevo, Aviv, 1998. "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-To-Eat Cereal Industry," Food Marketing Policy Center Research Reports 037, University of Connecticut, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Charles J. Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy.
- Nevo, Aviv, 1998. "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-To-Eat Cereal Industry," Research Reports 25164, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center.
- Berry, Steven T, 1992. "Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 889-917, July.
- Berry, Steven & Levinsohn, James & Pakes, Ariel, 1995. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 841-90, July.
- Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, 1990. "Entry in Monopoly Market," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(4), pages 531-553.
- Guillermo Caruana & Liran Einav, 2008. "A Theory of Endogenous Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 99-116.
- Daniel A. Ackerberg & Gautam Gowrisankaran, 2006.
"Quantifying equilibrium network externalities in the ACH banking industry,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 738-761, 09.
- Gautam Gowrisankaran & Daniel A. Ackerberg, 2003. "Quantifying Equilibrium Network Externalities in the ACH Banking Industry," Working Papers 03-06, NET Institute, revised Sep 2003.
- Daniel A. Ackerberg & Gautam Gowrisankaran, 2006. "Quantifying Equilibrium Network Externalities in the ACH Banking Industry," NBER Working Papers 12488, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Elie Tamer, 2003. "Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 147-165.
- Goettler, Ronald L & Shachar, Ron, 2001. "Spatial Competition in the Network Television Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 624-56, Winter.
- Borenstein, Severin & Netz, Janet, 1999. "Why do all the flights leave at 8 am?: Competition and departure-time differentiation in airline markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 611-640, July.
- Toivanen, Otto & Waterson, Michael, 2000. "Empirical research on discrete choice game theory models of entry: An illustration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 985-992, May.
- Reiss, Peter C, 1996. "Empirical Models of Discrete Strategic Choices," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 421-26, May.
- Bresnahan, Timothy F. & Reiss, Peter C., 1991. "Empirical models of discrete games," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1-2), pages 57-81.
- Kenneth S. Corts, 2001. "The Strategic Effects of Vertical Market Structure: Common Agency and Divisionalization in the US Motion Picture Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(4), pages 509-528, December.
- Ravid, S Abraham, 1999. "Information, Blockbusters, and Stars: A Study of the Film Industry," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72(4), pages 463-92, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:nawm04:626. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.