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Carpooling and the Economics of Self-Driving Cars

Author

Listed:
  • Ostrovsky, Michael

    (Stanford University)

  • Schwarz, Michael

    (Microsoft)

Abstract

We study the interplay between autonomous transportation, carpooling, and road pricing. We discuss how improvements in these technologies, and interactions among them, will affect transportation markets. Our main results show how to achieve socially efficient outcomes in such markets, taking into account the costs of driving, road capacity, and commuter preferences. An important component of the efficient outcome is the socially optimal matching of carpooling riders. Our approach shows how to set road prices and how to share the costs of driving and tolls among carpooling riders in a way that implements the efficient outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Ostrovsky, Michael & Schwarz, Michael, 2018. "Carpooling and the Economics of Self-Driving Cars," Research Papers 3636, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:3636
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    Cited by:

    1. Boffa, Federico & Fedele, Alessandro & Iozzi, Alberto, 2023. "Congestion and incentives in the age of driverless fleets," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    2. Berliant, Marcus, 2017. "Commuting and internet traffic congestion," MPRA Paper 77378, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Francisco Salas-Molina & Juan Antonio Rodr'iguez Aguilar & Filippo Bistaffa, 2020. "Shared value economics: an axiomatic approach," Papers 2006.00581, arXiv.org.
    4. Saxena, Aditya & Gupta, Vallary, 2023. "Carpooling: Who is closest to adopting it? An investigation into the potential car-poolers among private vehicle users: A case of a developing country, India," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 11-20.
    5. Fos, Vyacheslav & Hamdi, Naser & Kalda, Ankit & Nickerson, Jordan, 2019. "Gig-Labor: Trading Safety Nets for Steering Wheels," CEPR Discussion Papers 13885, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Eric Budish & Robin S. Lee & John J. Shim, 2024. "A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation: Will the Market Fix the Market?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(4), pages 1209-1246.
    7. Ron Yang, 2022. "(Don’t) Take Me Home: Home Preference and the Effect of Self-Driving Trucks on Interstate Trade," NBER Chapters, in: Economics of Artificial Intelligence, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Martin Adler & Stefanie Peer & Tanja Sinozic, 2019. "Autonomous, Connected, Electric Shared vehicles (ACES) and public finance: an explorative analysis," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-005/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
    9. Giulia Brancaccio & Myrto Kalouptsidi & Theodore Papageorgiou & Nicola Rosaia, 2020. "Search Frictions and Efficiency in Decentralized Transportation Markets," NBER Working Papers 27300, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Kalouptsidi, Myrto & Brancaccio, Giulia & Papageorgiou, Theodore & Rosaia, Nicola, 2020. "Search Frictions and Efficiency in Decentralized Transport Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 14827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Fos, Vyacheslav & Hamdi, Naser & Kalda, Ankit & Nickerson, Jordan, 2025. "Gig labor: Trading safety nets for steering wheels," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    12. Giulia Brancaccio & Myrto Kalouptsidi & Theodore Papageorgiou & Nicola Rosaia, 2020. "Search Frictions and Efficiency in Decentralized Transport Markets," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1010, Boston College Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General

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