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Collateral Policy in a World of Round-the-Clock Payment

  • Kahn, Charles M.

    (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

This paper examines competition between private and public payments settlement systems, and examines the consequences of round-the-clock private payments arrangements on the competitiveness of public systems. Central to the issue is the role of collateral both as a requirement for participation in central bank sponsored payments arrangements and as the backing for private intermediary arrangements. The presence of private systems serves as a check on the ability of a monetary authority to tighten monetary policy. Round-the-clock systems are an example of a collateral saving innovation that further pressures central bank pre-eminence in payments settlement.

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File URL: http://www.business.illinois.edu/Working_Papers/papers/10-0100.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business in its series Working Papers with number 10-0100.

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Date of creation: Oct 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ecl:illbus:10-0100
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.business.uiuc.edu/Working_Papers/Main.asp

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  1. Aleksander Berentsen & Cyril Monnet, 2008. "Monetary policy in a channel system," Working Papers 08-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  2. Aleksander Berentsen & Gabriele Camera & Christopher Waller, . "Money, Credit and Banking," IEW - Working Papers 219, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  3. Kahn, Charles M. & Roberds, William, 2009. "Why pay? An introduction to payments economics," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-23, January.
  4. Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1982. "The Real-Bills Doctrine versus the Quantity Theory: A Reconsideration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1212-36, December.
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