Collateral Policy in a World of Round-the-Clock Payment
This paper examines competition between private and public payments settlement systems, and examines the consequences of round-the-clock private payments arrangements on the competitiveness of public systems. Central to the issue is the role of collateral both as a requirement for participation in central bank sponsored payments arrangements and as the backing for private intermediary arrangements. The presence of private systems serves as a check on the ability of a monetary authority to tighten monetary policy. Round-the-clock systems are an example of a collateral saving innovation that further pressures central bank pre-eminence in payments settlement.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2009|
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