Unofficial payments for acute state hospital care in Kazakhstan. A model of physician behaviour with price discrimination and vertical service differentiation
We consider a discriminatory pricing and service differentiation model where: a)state physicians exploit their monopoly position and adjust quality to the unofficial payment made, and b)patients, perceiving state provision as poor, pay unofficially to improve it. Applying OLS and probit analysis to survey data on patients discharged from Almaty City hospitals, and using admission wait, length of stay (LOS) and a subjective categorical variable as quality measures. Unofficial payments are positively associated with surgical admission wait and the subjective quality of care while negatively associated with hospital LOS. Evidence suggests that price discrimination and service differentiation takes place in Kazakhstan.
|Date of creation:||04 Jun 2003|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +44 1334 462479
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/society/annualconf.asp
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2003:224. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.